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Abstract—Perceiving and understanding cyber-attacks can
be a difficult task. This problem is widely recognised and
well documented, and more effective techniques are needed
to aid cyber-attack perception. Attack modelling techniques
(AMTs) - such as attack graphs and fault trees, are useful vi-
sual aids that can aid cyber-attack perception; however, there
is little empirical or comparative research which evaluates
the effectiveness of these methods. This paper reports the
results of an empirical evaluation between an adapted attack
graph method and the fault tree standard to determine which
of the two methods is more effective in aiding cyber-attack
perception. An empirical evaluation (n=63) was conducted
through a 3 × 2 × 2 factorial design. Participants from
computer-science and non computer-science backgrounds
were divided into an adapted attack graph and fault tree
group and then asked to complete three tests which tested the
ability to recall, comprehend and apply the attack modelling
technique. A mean assessment score (mas) was calculated for
each test.
The results show that the adapted attack graph method
is more effective at aiding cyber-attack perception when
compared with the fault tree method (p<0.01). Participants
that have a computer science background outperformed
other participants when using both methods (p<0.05). These
results indicate that the adapted attack graph method can be
an effective tool for aiding cyber-attack perception amongst
experts. The study underlines the need for further compar-
isons in a broader range of settings involving additional
techniques, and suggests several suggestions for further
work.
Index Terms—Cyber-attack, attack modelling, cyber-
visualisation, attack graph, fault tree, attack tree
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent well known attacks such as the WannaCry
ransomware attack [1] have highlighted problems relating
to the ability of decision makers to perceive cyber-security
- in particular cyber-attacks [2]. The problem of perception
in the present study relates to the ability to assess and
understand the sequence of events that led to a cyber-
attack. This problem applies to expert computing/IT prac-
titioners - who have to make real time incident response
decisions as well as non-experts, such as CEOs - who
are part of the decision-making process and may not
fully understand the technical implications. CEOs have
low cyber-literacy levels - with 91% reporting problems
with interpreting cyber-security reports [3]. Decision mak-
ers can be poorly advised and under-prepared to tackle
cyber-security challenges [4] and don’t necessarily possess
the key knowledge and understanding to drive action
[5, 2]. Consequently, there is a view that decision makers
consider the cyber-security domain to be perceptually
inaccessible [6].
Better techniques are required to aid the understanding
of cyber-security among such audiences so as to enable
a more effective understanding of risk [7] and better
decision making. Attack modelling techniques (AMT) are
a method of modelling and visualising the sequence of
events that enable a successful cyber-attack on a host or
network. AMTs allow analysts to understand the underly-
ing susceptibility of a host or network to a cyber-attack
- and in doing so, to identify weaknesses and vulnerabil-
ities in a host or network. Furthermore, these techniques
permit decision-makers and other non-experts to form an
understanding of potential underlying vulnerabilities and
means of preventing them.
Although AMTs serve a useful academic and practical
purpose, there has been little or no research on the mea-
surable cognitive impact of AMTs - on both experts and
non-experts. This situation exists for many other visual
information flow models as well. For example, there exist
few if any controlled evaluations comparing data flow
charts or status diagrams with other methods of expressing
information flow. Quite often there is a presumption that
a particular visual method is the ‘best’ mechanism for
expressing information flow. This is an important research
area, and this paper contributes towards addressing this
research gap by presenting the results of an empirical
evaluation of attack graphs and fault trees as methods of
aiding cyber-attack perception.
Although numerous research papers have deployed
attack graphs to represent cyber-attacks, there is no
standardised attack graph method. More than fifty self-
nominated methods have been adopted in the academic
literature to display an attack graph - each of which
represents the key aspects of a cyber attack in a subtly
different way. The domain space demands the proposal
of a validly formulated attack graph method which fully
represents the fundamental cyber-attack constructs. Fault
trees on the other hand are defined by an international
standard [8] and have been used to describe cyber-attacks.
This study compares an adapted attack graph (aag)
with the fault tree method to determine which of the
two methods is more effective at aiding cyber-attack
perception. While the two methods bear some conceptual
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similarities, they differ in terms of the symbol construction
and data flow, and the study attempts to outline which
of the two sets of visual structures is more effective at
aiding cyber-attack perception. The term ‘effectiveness’ in
the present context refers to the ability of a participant to
respond correctly to a question requiring the interpretation
of the visual syntax of a given AMT. The study finds
that the aag method is more effective than the fault tree
method (p < 0.01) at aiding cyber-attack perception.
Furthermore, participants with some computer science
knowledge demonstrated a higher ranking when using
aag in comparison with those using the fault tree method
(p < 0.05) signifying that the aag method can be effective
in increasing cyber-attack perception amongst experts.
The novelty and contributions of the work presented
herein are as follows, the research:
1) Demonstrates that the aag can be used as a more
effective method of aiding cyber-attack perception
amongst expert audiences when compared with fault
trees
2) Proposes a methodology that enables researchers to
measure the effectiveness of visual information flow
methods
3) Outlines initial efforts towards defining a standard-
ised attack graph method.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section
II outlines related work. Section III introduces the aag
method and fault tree methods. Section IV outlines the
experimental framework and outlines the methods used,
the demographics of the participants and the procedure
followed by the participants. Section V provides an ana-
lytical overview of the results - particularly highlighting
the tests applied to the results to highlight the statistical
significance. Section VI explains the results and outlines
areas for further research.
II. BACKGROUND
The ability to present security problems in a manner
that enables decision makers to effectively perceive the
problem is a key security challenge [9]. The visualisa-
tion of complex knowledge and information structures
helps learners to better perceive complex concepts. Visual
methods such as AMTs have considerable value in aid-
ing cyber-attack perception [10, 11]. Fithen et al., [12]
outline the benefits of attack visualisation by arguing
that AMTs enable non-experts to better understand and
interpret attack models with little reference to logical
models. Roschke et al., [13] propose that AMTs remove
the intellectual burden from security experts who have
to understand and evaluate numerous potential options.
Effective visual representations enable security personnel
to achieve a quick understanding of the problem domain.
A lot of the research into cyber-attack perception ap-
pears to have focussed on aiding the cyber situational
awareness of experts [14, 15, 16], However, there is a
recognition - expressed largely in the business press, that
there is a wide-spread problem of cyber-attack perception
amongst non-experts [5, 6] and a recognition that AMTs
can aid the assessment and understanding of cyber-attacks.
However, there is a dearth of academic research into the
benefits of AMTs on cyber-attack perception.
Opdahl and Sindre [17] performed a qualitative eval-
uation which compared the attack tree method with
misuse cases in aiding practitioner perception in threat
identification. Opdahl and Sindre set out to evaluate the
effectiveness of the two techniques - measured as the
number of threats found by participants in two sample
scenarios, the number/types of threats found by partici-
pants; and participant perceptions of the two techniques.
The research presented three key findings. The attack tree
method was more effective in aiding threat identification
when compared with the misuse case method, participant
perceptions of two techniques were similar, however, par-
ticipant perception did not correlate with the performance
of the participant in using the selected technique.
The contribution by Flaten and Lund [18] attempted to
understand whether attack trees could improve an expert’s
understanding of a cyber-security threat. The research
harnessed the views of two cyber-security experts who
answered a number of questions regarding two attack
scenarios - both presented as attack trees. The study found
that attack trees are not suited for aiding cyber-attack
perception in cyber-security experts. Other than these two
studies there appears to have been no other research
focussing on the cognitive benefits of AMTs.
The key differences between the approaches of Op-
dahl and Sindre, and Flaten and Lund and the approach
presented herein are as follows. The contribution by
Flaten and Lund involved a small number of participants
(n=2) and considered one AMT. The present study adopts
a quantitative approach with 63 participants. The two
methods compared by Opdahl and Sindre (attack trees
and misuse cases) are considerably different in terms of
their visual syntax. Such a comparison requires a careful
analysis and consideration of the impact that differences
in the two techniques could have on participants.
The present method compares two conceptually simi-
lar techniques. Such an approach allows for a focussed
analysis of the two techniques and enables a refined un-
derstanding of the differences between the two techniques.
III. ATTACK MODELLING TECHNIQUES
AMTs represent cyber-attacks by using semantic meth-
ods (formal languages) and/or visual syntax [72] in the
form of a tree/graph/net. The visual representation of
an attack - referred to herein as ‘visual syntax’, utilises
symbolic modes of expression to visualise one or more of
the three fundamental cyber-attack constructs which are:
the preconditions/postconditions of a cyber-attack (also
referred to as a ‘status’); exploits (also referred to as an
‘event’); and precondition logic. Examples of these are
given in Figure 1 where a precondition is represented as
a box, an exploit as an ellipse and precondition logic by
the presence or absence of an arc connecting two edges.
An exploit can be represented as a tuple of the form:
(hs, hd, v) wherein source host hs can exploit a vulnera-
bility v which exists on a destination host hd [73].
A precondition is one or more host/system statuses that
must exist for an exploit to be successful. The postcon-
dition is the state of the host/system once the exploit has
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Category Sub Category References
Attack
Attack trees [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]
Tree
Defense trees [26, 27, 28, 29]
Threat trees [30, 31, 32]
Fault trees [33]
Attack nets [20, 34, 33, 35]
Threat nets [36]
Protection Trees [37, 38]
Vulnerability
Trees [39, 40, 41, 42, 43]
Attack
‘General’ Attack
graphs [44, 45, 46] and [47]
Graph Alert Correlation
Graphs
Alert Correlation Graphs:
[48, 49, 50, 24, 51, 13, 52];
Hyper-Alert Correlation Graphs:
[53]
Privilege graphs [54], [55], [56]
Vulnerability
graph
Exploitation graphs: [57, 58, 59];
Exploit dependency graphs:
[44, 60]; Exploit oriented graphs:
[61]; State enumeration attack
graphs: [61]; Dependency attack
graph: [61]
Others
Petri Net Based
Models [20, 34, 33]
Influence
diagrams
[62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67], extended
influence diagram [68, 69]
Kill chains [70]
Diamond model [71]
Table I: Attack Modelling Techniques
been applied. Quite often, the postcondition is in itself the
precondition to another exploit.
Precondition logic is the conjunctive/disjunctive
(AND/OR) relationship between preconditions. Quite
often, one or more conditions must exist for an exploit to
be successful.
A conjunctive precondition relationship requires all the
connected preconditions to be fulfilled for the exploit to
be successful. An example of this is provided in Figure 1
wherein two preconditions must exist for the sshd bof(3,1)
exploit to be applied: sshd(3,1) and user(3). A disjunctive
precondition relationship requires for any one or more of
the connected preconditions to be fulfilled for the exploit
to be successful. An example of this is provided in Figure
1. In this example, any one of two exploits (sshd bof(1,2)
or sshd bof(3,2)) must be applied to gain user(2) status
on the target machine. It is not common for precondition
logic to be represented in a given AMT, however, it is
important for an analyst to know the relationship between
the conditions. Addressing just one of multiple conjunctive
preconditions - which an exploit relies upon, can act as a
suitable mitigation strategy.
Numerous AMTs have been proposed in the academic
literature. A number of the more popular AMTs are
highlighted in Table I and include: attack trees [19, 20],
defence trees [26, 27, 28], privilege graphs [56], ex-
ploitation graphs or e-graphs, [57, 59], fault trees [33],
Petri Net Models [20, 34, 33], alert correlation graphs
[48, 49, 51, 13, 52] and influence diagrams [62, 63, 64]. Of
these methods, fault trees and Petri nets are the only attack
modelling techniques to be defined in an international
standard [8, 74]. Some of these methods - for example
fault trees and Petri nets, were not designed to represent
cyber-attacks, but have been used in the literature to
describe cyber-attacks.
A. Selection of AMT
The present study compares an adapted attack graph
method with the fault tree method. Attack graphs and fault
trees were chosen for the empirical comparison for reasons
of functionality and because they are widely academically
accepted.
Functionality: One of the key factors in selecting the
two methods to be compared was whether the method is
able to represent the fundamental cyber-attack constructs
without requiring significant modification. Of all the meth-
ods outlined in Table I, attack graphs (particularly those
described by Barik and Mazumdar [47] and Ghosh and
Ghosh [75]) and fault trees are able to represent these
constructs with very little or no modification. Methods
such as kill chains [70] and the diamond model [71] are
not designed to represent the fundamental cyber-attack
constructs. Petri nets were designed to enable experts to
understand information flow and control in systems and
are particularly useful in describing systems that exhibit
concurrency and asynchronous behaviour [76]. They are
useful for experts but do not lend themselves to easy
perception by non experts. It would be unfair to compare
such a system with a method that is much more visually
expressive.
Academic acceptance: Attack graphs and fault trees
are an accepted and popular form of attack representation
amongst the academic community and have been applied
in multiple wide ranging scenarios. Methods such as
kill chains and the diamond model are popular amongst
the business community but not necessarily amongst the
academic community.
The fault tree design is governed by an international
standard [8] which defines numerous symbols. A small
subset of these symbols are ideal for use in describing a
cyber-attack scenario - making the fault tree method ideal
for comparison.
Both methods are described more fully in section III-C1
and III-C2.
B. Visual Structures
The adapted attack graph (aag) method is based on the
attack graph representations by Noel et al., [44], Foo et al.,
[45], Wang et al., [46], and Barik and Mazumdar [47]. The
adapted attack graph method is demonstrated in Figures
1 (right), 2 (right) and 3 (right) and the following key
explains the icons used therein.
• Preconditions/postconditions: rectangle
• Exploits: ellipse
• Conjunction: arc connecting preconditions
• Disjunction: Absence of an arc connecting precondi-
tions
• Grey rectangle: overall attack goal
The two models are conceptually similar. However,
there are some fundamental differences in their visual
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Construct
Fault tree Adapted AttackGraph
Exploit
Precondition
And
Or
Event Flow Bottom to top Top to Bottom
Table II: Visual Syntactic Differences between the Fault
Tree and Adapted Attack Graph Methods
syntax structures which are likely to render differences
in cognitive perception. These differences are presented
in Table II and can be summarised as follows.
• Symbol usage Both methods utilise two symbols to
represent exploits and preconditions. aag utilises an
ellipse for an exploit and a rectangle for a precon-
dition. For the fault tree method it is the other way
around.
• Representation of precondition logic. The fault tree
method utilises two symbols to represent precon-
dition logic. The aag method utilises the presence
or absence of an arc to represent conjunction and
disjunction respectively
• Symbol count. Correspondingly, the total number of
symbols used in the fault tree method is four, in the
aag method it is two
• Event flow. Events flow upwards in a fault tree (or
rather conceptual reasoning starts at the top) whereas
in the aag method (and in attack graphs in general)
they flow downwards
Some of these simple differences such as the inclusion
of a specific symbol to represent an OR condition - thereby
increasing the total symbol count, and the direction of
information flow are likely to impact the results.
C. Attack Graphs and Fault Trees
1) Attack Graphs: Attack graphs are possibly the most
popular AMT - particularly in the academic literature.
An attack graph is a mathematical abstraction of attack
paths that might be perpetrated against a given system
[77, 78]. The graph comprises of nodes which represent
exploits/attacks/events and edges which represent a change
of status.
The nodes in the graph can represent a range of ele-
ments such as:
• An exploit that has been or could be applied to the
given node [61, 79, 80]
• An event such as an access violation [81] or a remote
server exploit [82, 51] which forms the necessary
stages in an attack
• A status or condition attained by an exploit [83]. Ex-
amples of this include preconditions/postconditions.
Quite often, preconditions/postconditions are defined
as privileges [55, 56]
Edges in an attack graph can be directed - to represent
specific transitions, or undirected - to represent a general
connection between two nodes and generally represent the
perpetration of an exploit. However, edges can also rep-
resent: actions [84], preconditions - where a precondition
edge e = (a, s) exists if a is a precondition of s [57], or
vulnerabilities - where a vulnerability edge represents a
vulnerability that a perpetrator could exploit [85, 78].
2) Fault Trees: Both fault trees and attack trees find
their origins in decision trees which aid decision making
through the representation of three elements: a deci-
sion node, edge/branch and leaf. Although decision trees
have been applied to a computer/cyber security context
[86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 40], decision trees were not designed
to aid visual consumption, and it is probably for these
reasons that methods such as attack trees and fault trees
were developed. Schneier recast decision trees in the form
of attack trees [19] and may have been influenced by the
fault tree method [40].
Attack trees and fault trees are acyclic directed graphs
which outline important events and conditions. Events lead
to a goal condition which is referred to as an attack goal
in an attack tree [19], and an undesirable condition in the
case of a fault tree [91].
The symbolic representation of fault trees was standard-
ised by the IEC in 1990, [8], the European Cooperation
for Space Standardization [92] and then by the British
Standards Institute [93]. However, although the fault tree
structure is standardised, there is no agreed method of
representing attack trees, and - like attack graphs, there
exist numerous - subtly different versions of attack trees.
Fault trees are the most visually expressive AMT be-
cause they utilise a wide range of standard symbols to
express elements of an attack. Fault trees are used in a
number of industries such as in the aerospace industry
[94, 95, 96, 97], radioactive waste disposal [98], the auto-
motive industry [99, 100] and in the analysis of failure in
computer systems [101, 102, 103]. Although the fault tree
standard is a generic standard (not particularly focussing
on cyber-security as a target domain), more recently, fault
trees have become a popular means of representing cyber-
attack [40, 104, 105].
Example fault trees are given in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
These examples demonstrate the use of conjunction and
disjunction with specific symbols, preconditions as ovals
and exploits as rectangles.
3) Syntactic Structure: Attack graphs and fault trees
comprise of two fundamental elements represented as
graph data structures of the form: G(V ;E) [108] which
comprises of nodes and edges: e ∈ E which represent
relationships between the nodes. An attack graph/fault tree
is a tuple G = (S, τ, S0, Ss, L,E) where:
• S is a finite set of states,
• τ ⊆ S × S is a transition relation
• S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states
• Ss ⊆ S is a set of success states – for example
obtaining root or user privileges on a particular host
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Test Lower order
cognitive skill
Test
Description
Scenario
reference
Sample question
1 Knowledge
Recall
Multiple Choice
select one answer
scenario
1 [47]. 4
questions
“What are the necessary exploits for an attacker to be able to achieve user
access on host 2”, also see Figure 4
2 Comprehension Select correct
scenario from a
heatmap
scenario
2 [75] 4
questions
“Study the image below and select the exploit(s) which result in the attacker
gaining user access status on host 2.”
3 Application Multiple Choice,
read scenario and
select one from
three heat maps
scenario 3
[106, 107]
4 questions
Study the figure below and select the figure that most accurately describes
the following scenario: “The stuxnet virus is installed when a new ser-
vices.exe file and a new s7otdbxdx.dll file are installed. Before these can be
installed, the following preconditions must be met. The target has to have
the RPC vulnerability, the target has to be running the Step7 application,
and the target has to be a Stimatic PLC”
Table III: Description of Study Scenarios and Tests
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling of states with a set of
atomic propositions (AP)
• E is a finite set of exploits which connect the transi-
tion between two states
IV. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
A. Design
The empirical evaluation uses three independent vari-
ables (test, AMT, background) and one dependent variable
(mean assessment score - mas).
The study aims to evaluate whether any of the three in-
dependent variables (test, AMT and background) influence
cyber-attack perception.
The test is a within participant independent variable
which represents the three questions asked to participants.
Cyber-attack assessment and understanding was measured
using a three phase test which demands the demonstration
of increasingly complex cognitive skills. Table III provides
an overview of its characteristics. Each test corresponded
to one of the three lower levels (knowledge, comprehen-
sion and application) of Bloom’s Taxonomy of educational
objectives [109]. Bloom’s taxonomy has been used in
numerous academic fields to assess both lower and higher
order cognitive skills. The result of the test is measured
as a mean assessment score mas - the dependent variable.
The wording of the questions was carefully prepared
to correspond with guidance provided on how to frame
questions and utilise keywords so as to correspond with
levels within the taxonomy (for example, see [110]). The
test framework - including question samples, are provided
in Table III.
The background independent variable is divided into
two groups: cs and oth. The cs group have a computer
science background. These participants have either studied
computer science at undergraduate level, or have more
than five years of work experience in the computing
industry. The other group are all other participants.
There are two AMT groups: aag and ft - each presented
with an adapted attack graph or fault tree scenario respec-
tively.
The following two hypotheses were established:
H11 The selection of AMT influences re-
sponse to mas
H21 The selection of background influences
response to mas
The AMT and background form the two between-
participant independent variables and the design can be
described as: 3 (test) × 2 (AMT) × 2 (background) yield-
ing 12 different conditions. A two-way repeated-measures
ANOVA test was used to determine the significance of the
results.
The same scenarios were used and all participants
were asked the same questions in the same sequence.
Collectively, these formed the control variables.
B. Materials
Each test utilised a corresponding attack scenario which
was converted into an attack graph and corresponding
fault tree. Attack scenario 1 (Figure 1) and 2 (Figure 2)
were based on the fictional attack graphs produced by
Barik and Mazumdar [47] and Ghosh and Ghosh [75]
respectively. These scenarios were selected as they are
published scenarios and have small visual structures in
terms of the number of cyber-attack constructs being used.
Attack scenario 3 was developed by the authors and
based on the Stuxnet attack - a well-known virus attack
[107, 106]. The Stuxnet attack is very complex, and the
resulting attack graph/fault tree contains more than sixty
cyber-attack constructs. Consequently, a small section of
the Stuxnet attack - representing the exploitation of the
task scheduler vulnerability was used for the scenario.
Part of the scenario is presented in Figure 3. The compre-
hension context assumes that experts and non-experts are
analysing and interpreting the visual syntax in particular
- and not necessarily the formal syntactic definitions. In
other words, the observer doesn’t necessarily need to have
a technical understanding of the attack.
In a professional setting, although the analysis of an
attack might begin by focussing on the full attack graph,
quite often, the decision maker/analyst proceeds to focus
on the poignant elements of the attack. Consequently, a
small section of the overall graph was considered appro-
priate for the present study. A further exploration of the
cognitive impact and effects of studying small/large attack
models by different stakeholders over longer periods of
time may be useful and is considered for future work.
The third scenario is quite different in style compared
with scenarios 1 and 2. Scenario 3 is presented using
a simpler explanatory narrative in comparison with sce-
narios 1 and 2. It was considered important to be able
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sshd_bof(3,1)
user(1)
user(3)
sshd(1,2)
user(2)
sshd_bof(3,2)sshd_bof(1,2)
sshd(3,1)
sshd(3,2) user(3)
sshd_bof(1,2)
user(2)
sshd_bof(3,2)
sshd_bof(3,1)
user(3)sshd(3,1)
user(1) sshd(3,2)sshd(1,2) user(3)
Figure 1. Cyber-attack Scenario 1 repre-
sented as a fault tree (left) and an attack
graph (right) (based on Barik and Mazumdar
[47]). The three fundamental cyber-attack
constructs are preconditions - represented as
boxes in the attack graph and ellipses in the
fault tree, exploits - represented as ellipses in
the attack graph and boxes in the fault tree,
and precondition logic - AND represented by
the presence of an arc in the attack graph
and ‘semi-ellipse’ in the fault tree and the
OR represented by the absence of an arc in
an attack graph and an ‘elliptic triangle’ in
a fault tree
ftp_rhosts(1,2)
user(1)
trust(1,2)
rsh(1,2)
user(2)
local_bof(2,2)
root(2)
sshd_bof(0,2)
sshd(0,2) user(0)
ftp(0,1)
rsh(1,2)
local_bof(2,2)
sshd_bof(0,2)
user(0) sshd(0,2)
user(2)
trust(1,2)
ftp_rhosts(1,2)
ftp(0,1) user(1)
root(2)
Figure 2. Cyber-attack Scenario 2, fault tree
(left), attack graph (right) (Based on Ghosh
and Ghosh [75])
Task Scheduler 
Vulnerability
Create malicious 
task
Malicious task is 
executed
Target is 
Windows 7
Target is 
Windows Vista
Target has Vulnerable 
Windows Operating 
System
Target has Task 
Scheduler 
Vulnerability
Create malicious 
task
Malicious task is 
executed
Target is 
Windows 7
Target is 
Windows Vista
Target has Vulnerable 
Windows Operating 
System
Figure 3. A Section of Cyber-attack Sce-
nario 3, fault tree (left), attack graph (right)
based on a small part of the Stuxnet attack
scenario described by Falliere et al., [106]
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to represent and test a portion of a ‘real life’ attack to
understand whether this impacted participant perception.
While the data content of the three scenarios differs
(formal syntax versus narrativised representation), the aim
of the study is to assess the cognitive impact of the
visual syntax. Consequently, one might assume that the
oth group are more likely to score higher - in test 3
in comparison with test 1 and 2, when presented with
such a representation. The results (Table V) indicate
no statistical differences in the ability of non-experts to
perceive the attack descriptions either when presented in
formal syntactic or textually narrativised terms.
The study was configured using the Qualtrics platform
[111]. The study was divided into three sections which:
gathered participant consent and other data; enabled the
participant to gain fundamental background information
relating to the AMT being studied; and then tested partic-
ipant perception through a sequence of questions (Figure
4).
C. Participants
84 participants were recruited for the study. 21 par-
ticipants did not complete the study leaving 63 partici-
pants. 43 males and 20 females aged between 21 and 58
(age = 29) were collected and grouped according to their
background groups (cs n=31, oth n=32) and then further
subdivided into AMT groups (aag n=31, ft n=32).
Participants were assigned to the aag/ft group randomly
to avoid bias within these groups - particularly to avoid a
situation where one group might understand cyber-attacks
at a conceptual level better than the other.
D. Procedure
Participants were required to access the study by fol-
lowing a url. The experiment sequence was as follows:
a. The first screen provided general data regarding the
study such as participant information, and required
the participant to provide consent
b. The second screen gathered participant data (age,
gender, experience)
c. The third screen enabled participants to study the
ontology and structure of the AMT they had been
assigned to.
d. Following this, participants were required to com-
plete the test
Each question in the test required the participant to
study an AMT and answer a question. Both the aag and
ft group were provided with exactly the same questions.
Participants were not able to revisit questions.
V. RESULTS
Due to the large amount of data collected, the results
are divided into subsections with a discussion following
in section VI. The mean assessment scores for each test
(mas1, mas2, mas3) were normalised and are outlined in
Table IV. Figure 5 shows the mean assessment score (mas)
vs group and mas vs AMT.
Table V highlights the mean differences between the
groups. The mean difference is presented as a delta
sshd_bof(3,1)
user(3)sshd(3,1)
user(1)
sshd(1,2) AND user(1)
sshd(3,1) OR user(3)
sshd(3,1) AND user(3)
sshd(1,2) OR user(1)
Study the attack graph on the left 
and then answer the following 
question:
What are the necessary preconditions 
for host 3 to be able to execute an 
sshd buffer overflow (sshd_bof) 
attack on host 1
Figure 4. A Sample From the Qualtrics Based Study
(δ) value: δmas(i)aag:ft = (mas(i)aag − mas(i)ft).
The mean differences for all three tests favours the
aag group (δmas1aag:ft = 0.1463, δmas2aag:ft =
0.2475, δmas3aag:ft = 0.0406). Furthermore the table
outlines the mean differences for the overall tests - giving
an overall δ(mas)aag:ft = 0.1448.
These descriptive results suggest that the aag method is
better at aiding attack perception when compared with the
fault tree method. Whilst the mas and the mean differences
appear to be significant, they require further investigation
to determine statistical significance.
A. Main Effects
The main effects of test, AMT (aag/ft) and background
(cs/oth) were analysed using a 3 (test) × 2 (AMT) × 2
(background) mixed design factorial ANOVA for all 63
participants as outlined in section IV-A. Mauchly’s Test of
Sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was
not violated (Maulchy’s test, χ2(2) = 1.309, p = 0.520).
1) Within-Participant Main Effects of test: The within-
participants main effect for test signified that participant
performance differed between tests (F (2, 118) = 3.232, p
= 0.043). Pair-wise comparisons were performed between
the three tests and statistically significant results from this
analysis are presented in Table VI and discussed further
for the AMT (section V-B1) and background (section
V-B2) groups.
2) Between-participants main effect of AMT: Hypothe-
sis 1 (H11) proposed that: the selection of AMT influences
response to mas. Hypothesis 1 holds and the between-
participants main effect for AMT revealed that the selec-
tion of AMT was significant, (F(1, 59) =8.004, p=0.006)
showing that there is a distinction between the two AMTs
with aag ranked higher than ft.
Table IV and Figure 5 outline differences in the
performance between the aag/ft groups - favouring the
aag group. (δmas1aag:ft = 0.1463, δmas2aag:ft =
0.2475, δmas3aag:ft = 0.0406). The aag group demon-
strated a better result overall for the test: δmasaag:ft =
0.1448. This is analysed further in section V-B1 to identify
differences within the aag and ft groups.
3) Between-participants main effect of background:
Hypothesis 2 (H21) proposed that: the selection of back-
ground influences response to mas. Hypothesis 2 holds
and the between-participants main effect for background
was statistically significant (F (1, 59) = 12.843, p =
0.001) showing that the selection of background influences
response to mas with cs ranked higher than oth.
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Test mas1 mas2 mas3
Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n
oth
aag 0.8353 0.2486 17 0.7582 0.2695 17 0.7059 0.3450 17
ft 0.6267 0.3530 15 0.5020 0.3760 15 0.5667 0.4169 15
Total 0.7375 0.3152 32 0.6381 0.3438 32 0.6406 0.3807 32
cs
aag 0.9357 0.1292 14 0.9386 0.1360 14 0.9107 0.1583 14
ft 0.8294 0.2024 17 0.6718 0.2903 17 0.9265 0.1929 17
Total 0.8774 0.1788 31 0.7923 0.2668 31 0.9194 0.1754 31
Total
aag 0.8806 0.2068 31 0.8397 0.2347 31 0.7984 0.2917 31
ft 0.7344 0.2966 32 0.5922 0.3387 32 0.7578 0.3619 32
Total 0.8063 0.2648 63 0.7140 0.3155 63 0.7778 0.3272 63
δaag:ft 0.1463 0.2475 0.0406
δ(cs : mas)aag:ft 0.1063 0.2668 -0.0158
δ(oth : mas)aag:ft 0.2086 0.2562 0.1392
Table IV: Mean Assessment Scores mas
mas1 mas2 mas3 mas
Delta Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean n
δaag:ft 0.1463 63 0.2475 63 0.0406 63 0.1448 63
δcsaag:ft 0.1063 31 0.2668 31 -0.0158 31 0.1191 31
δothaag:ft 0.2086 32 0.2562 32 0.1392 32 0.2013 32
δagcs:oth 0.1004 31 0.1804 31 0.2048 31 0.1619 31
δftcs:oth 0.2027 32 0.1698 32 0.3598 32 0.2441 32
NB: δ values are calculated as absolute differences
Table V: Mean Differences by AMT and group
Figure 5. Overall means of test vs AMT (left) and test vs group (right)
Table V and Figure 5 highlight the mean assess-
ment scores for the cs/oth groups. The Table shows
that δoth(mas)aag:ft = 0.2013 and δcs(mas)aag:ft =
0.1191. The data outlines what appears to be a distinct
difference favouring aag for both the cs and oth groups.
This is analysed further in section V-B2 to determine if
there is a statistically significant difference within the oth
and cs groups.
B. Results for test, background and AMT
The main effects were analysed further to discover
whether there are differences within the background and
AMT groups.
1) Results for AMT: The main effect for test was
further analysed using two: 3 (test) × 2 (background)
ANOVAs for aag (n=32) and ft (n=31) to explore further
effects. The between-participant effect signified that the
selection of background influences response to mas (F (1,
61)=10.321, p=0.002).
a) Results for aag: The between-participants effect
for AMT shows a statistically significant effect favouring
cs (F (1, 29) = 6.396, p = 0.017) signifying that selection
of background influences the mas score for the aag
method. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
showed that the cs group performed better than the oth
group (mean = 0.162, SD=0.064, p=0.017). This is indi-
cated by the overall mas results (Table V) which highlight
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group (i) test (j) test Mean differ-
ence (i-j)
std
error
sig
all 1 2 0.089 (↓) 0.035 0.039
ft 1 2 0.141 (↓) 0.052 0.032
2 3 0.160 (↑) 0.050 0.009
cs 2 3 0.113 (↑) 0.041 0.029
Table VI: Statistically Significant Within Participants Ef-
fect Results for Tests
a mas score favouring the cs group when using the attack
graph method (δaagcs:oth = 0.1619).
Pair-wise comparisons were performed between the
three tests for the aag group. There were no significant
differences between the tests for the aag group.
b) Results for ft: Similarly, the between-participants
effect for AMT shows a statistically significant effect
favouring cs (F (1, 30) = 6.954, p = 0.013) signifying
that selection of background influences the mas score for
the fault tree method. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni
correction showed that the cs group performed better than
the oth group (mean=0.244, SD=0.093, p=0.013). This
is further indicated by the overall mas results (Table V)
which highlights a mas score favouring the cs group when
using the fault tree method (δftcs:oth = 0.2441).
Pair-wise comparisons were performed between the
three tests between the ft group. Table VI shows that the ft
group demonstrated a reduction in mas of 0.141 between
tests 1 and 2 (p=0.032) and an increase of 0.160 between
2 and 3 (p=0.009).
2) Results for background: The main effect for test was
further analysed using two: 3 (test) × 2 (AMT) ANOVAs
for cs and oth to explore further effects. The between-
participant effect signified that the selection of AMT
influences the mas score (F (1, 61) = 5.536, p = 0.022).
a) Results for cs: The between-participants effect
for background shows a statistically significant effect for
AMT (F (1, 29) = 5.276, p = 0.029) signifying that the
selection of AMT influences the mas score for the csft
group. Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
showed that the csaag group performed better than the
csft group (mean = 0.119, SD=0.052, p=0.029). This
is further indicated by the overall mas results (Table
V) which shows an overall mas favouring the csaag
(δcsaag:ft = 0.1191).
Pair-wise comparisons between the three tests (Table
VI) show that the cs group demonstrated an increase in
mas of 0.113 between 2 and 3 (p=0.029).
b) Results for oth: The between-participants effect
for background did not signify a statistically significant
effect for AMT (F (1, 30) = 4.104, p = 0.052) showing
that the selection of AMT is not significant for participants
in the oth group.
Pair-wise comparisons between the three tests for the
oth group (Table VI) showed no significant differences
between in the mas scores for the oth group.
VI. DISCUSSION
This study investigated which of the two AMTs was
more effective in aiding cyber-attack perception. The study
also explored whether any demonstrable benefits of either
of the two methods occurred under specific background
grouping conditions.
Hypothesis 1 (H11) tested whether the selection of
AMT influences response to mas. This hypothesis holds
and the study finds that the aag method is better at
aiding attack perception when compared with the fault
tree method (p <0.01). A straightforward comparison of
the means for both groups reveals an mas favouring the
aag method for every test.
Hypothesis 2 (H21) tested whether the selection of
background influences response to mas. This hypothesis
holds and the study finds that the aag method can be an
effective tool for aiding cyber-attack perception amongst
experts. As expected, participants that have a computer
science background outperformed other participants when
using both methods (p <0.05) but demonstrated a prefer-
ence for the aag method.
A comparison of the mas scores (Table IV) indicates
a preference for the aag method compared with the fault
tree method for the non-computer science group. However,
this result was not statistically significant and has to be
treated with caution.
Given that the three tests tested progressively advanced
cognitive levels - rather than testing the same cognitive
level each time, one might expect a minimum desirable
result to be a stable performance across the cognitive
levels. However, differences in performance (Table VI)
were demonstrated between some of the tests. This was
most significant for the fault tree group between tests
1 and 2 (a decrease) and test 2 and 3 (an increase).
The performance increased between tests 2 and 3 for
the computer science fault tree participants. There was
no significant difference in the performance of the attack
graph group. Notably, there was a consistent cognitive
performance across the three tests for the aag method
group with no significant decrease in performance.
Added to this, one might expect a better cognitive
performance for the oth group for test 3 in comparison
with tests 1 and 2 - given the difference in narrative style
of the question. This was not the case, and as Table VI
shows, there was no difference between the tests for the
oth group.
Although the aag method rendered a better mas overall,
there was a negligible difference in terms of mas3 which
tests the ability to apply the two methods. In other words,
participants in both the aag and ft were able to effectively
apply the methods in given scenarios. This requires further
research in a more focussed study.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The growing number of cyber-attacks and the increased
need for both experts and non-experts to better understand
cyber-attack leads to the requirement for better techniques
and methodologies that can be used to more quickly and
effectively to appraise audiences on the methods used to
perpetrate cyber-attacks and the weaknesses in systems
that enable such attacks to prevail.
The main contribution of this research has been to show
that the aag method is better than the fault tree method
in aiding cyber-attack perception.
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A. Limitations and Future Work
The present research has revealed limitations and areas
for further research that should be explored to further
reason with the results presented herein.
a) Benefits on perception of non-experts: The study
revealed that the aag method could be suitable for aiding
cyber-attack perception amongst non-expert audiences -
such as CEOs. Although the results in this regard were not
statistically significant, this requires a further larger study
to identify whether the method can indeed aid cyber-attack
perception amongst non-experts.
b) Measurement of Effectiveness: The present study
assessed the ability of participants to comprehended the
visual syntax. The study measured effectiveness as the
ability to respond correctly to a question requiring the
interpretation of the visual syntax of a given AMT. This
definition can be expanded further to include timeliness
and attack severity.
Although the time taken to complete the study was
measured, this was not analysed in the measurement of
‘effectiveness’ because the present study considered it
more important to allow participants to apply due con-
sideration to each question than to place the participant
under time based pressure.
An alternative analysis would be to take into account
the correctness of the response as a function of time. The
severity of an incorrect response could also be considered
important. Further research requires the development of
a methodology reflecting effectiveness based on three
variables: correctness, time and severity.
c) Understanding key visual syntactic factors: Fur-
ther research should attempt to understand which elements
of the visual structure of an AMT - described in section
III-C2, are more significant in aiding cyber-attack per-
ception. In addition, it would be beneficial to understand
the effect on perception of visual structural elements such
as colour, tone, line width/density/structure. In particular,
further research should explore improvements to aag
which balance the tradeoff between providing more visual
information - such as the inclusion of elements such as
attacker capability and/or uncertainty, whilst maintaining
effective cognitive perception.
The symbol count, (including a specific symbol for OR
in an FT increases the total symbol count), the direction of
information flow are likely to have impacted the results.
In a follow up study, we will be comparing these in a
subjective evaluation.
d) Acceptability amongst practitioners: It is critical
that any method of representing cyber-attacks gains ac-
ceptance amongst practitioners. Such an audience would
include teacher-practitioners (lecturers who might use
the method to teach cyber-attack), non-expert corpo-
rate/decision makers and cyber-security analysts. Further
research should test the aag method with these audiences
to determine the efficacy of the method in aiding cyber-
attack perception in a live environment.
e) Complexity: The attack scenarios used in the
study were relatively small and comprised of up to 14
symbols (Figure 2). This is not representative of complex
cyber-attacks such as the Stuxnet virus [107, 106], Jeep
Cherokee Hack [112] and the Sony Hack [113, 114].
Further research should examine the effectiveness of the
aag method when presenting larger scenarios.
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